Entendendo a seleção de local de organizações charter de organização educacional com fins lucrativos by Lee, Jin
Journal website: http://epaa.asu.edu/ojs/   Manuscript received: 4/24/2017 
Facebook: /EPAAA  Revisions received: 3/27/2018 
Twitter: @epaa_aape  Accepted: 6/13/2018 
 
education policy analysis 
archives 
A peer-reviewed, independent,  
open access, multilingual journal  
 
 
 
 
 
  
 Arizona State University 
 
Volume 26 Number 77       July 2, 2018 ISSN 1068-2341 
 
 
Understanding Site Selection of For-profit Educational 
Management Organization Charter Schools 
Jin Lee 
University of Louisiana at Lafayette 
United States 
 
Citation: Lee, J. (2018). Understanding site selection of for-profit educational management 
organization charter schools. Education Policy Analysis Archives, 26(77). 
http://dx.doi.org/10.14507/epaa.26.3024   
 
Abstract: The rise of for-profit EMOs often becomes evidence of substantial shifts in the 
governance of education, through which schooling may become privatized and 
commercialized. This study is designed to understand the economic behavior of for-profit 
educational management organization charter schools, by focusing on their site selection 
decisions as a critical factor in making a profit. Using the locations of for-profit EMO 
charter schools in Michigan, the study examines determinants of the location decision on 
charter school markets, with the choice set of potential school districts. This research finds 
changes of the odds ratio in the percentage of for-profit EMO charter schools, logged 
expenditures per pupil, and in the proportions of African-American populations, 
populations who have experienced higher education, and unemployed populations. 
Provided that for-profit EMO charter schools make a site selection decision according to 
areas with certain characteristics, the spatial disparity of access to charter schools can raise 
issues concerning unequal educational opportunities. 
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Entendiendo la selección de local de organizaciones charter de organización 
educativa con fines de lucro 
Resumen: La aparición de EMO con fines de lucro a menudo se convierte en evidencia 
de cambios sustanciales en la gobernanza de la educación, a través de los cuales la 
escolarización puede tornarse privatizada y comercializada. Este estudio fue elaborado para 
entender el comportamiento económico de las escuelas charter de organizaciones de 
gestión educativa con fines lucrativos, concentrándose en sus decisiones de selección de 
local como un factor crítico para obtener ganancias. Utilizando la ubicación de escuelas 
charter EMO con fines de lucro en Michigan, el estudio examina los determinantes de la 
decisión de localización en los mercados de escuelas chárter, con la elección de los 
distritos escolares potenciales. Esta investigación encuentra cambios en la razón de 
posibilidades en el porcentaje de escuelas charter EMO con fines lucrativos, gastos 
registrados por alumno, y en las proporciones de poblaciones afroamericanas, que tienen 
educación superior y poblaciones desempleadas. Dado que las escuelas charter EMO con 
fines de lucro toman una decisión de selección de local de acuerdo con áreas con ciertas 
características, la disparidad espacial de acceso a escuelas charter puede plantear cuestiones 
sobre oportunidades educativas desiguales. 
Palabras clave: con fines de lucro; organización de gestión educativa; escuela charter; 
localización 
 
Entendendo a seleção de local de organizações charter de organização educacional 
com fins lucrativos 
Resumo: O surgimento de EMOs com fins lucrativos muitas vezes se torna evidência de 
mudanças substanciais na governança da educação, através das quais a escolarização pode 
se tornar privatizada e comercializada. Este estudo foi elaborado para entender o 
comportamento econômico das escolas charter de organizações de gestão educacional com 
fins lucrativos, concentrando-se em suas decisões de seleção de local como um fator 
crítico para obter lucro. Usando a localização de escolas charter EMO com fins lucrativos 
em Michigan, o estudo examina os determinantes da decisão de localização em mercados 
de escolas charter, com a escolha de potenciais distritos escolares. Esta pesquisa encontra 
mudanças na razão de chances na porcentagem de escolas charter EMO com fins 
lucrativos, gastos registrados por aluno, e nas proporções de populações afro-americanas, 
que têm educação superior e populações desempregadas. Desde que as escolas charter 
EMO com fins lucrativos tomem uma decisão de seleção de local de acordo com áreas 
com certas características, a disparidade espacial de acesso a escolas charter pode levantar 
questões sobre oportunidades educacionais desiguais.  
Palavras-chave: com fins lucrativos; organização de gestão educacional; escola charter; 
localização 
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Introduction 
As recent school policies triggered by market metaphors put weight on competition among 
educational service providers, educational marketplaces are facing growing diversification in 
management with the involvement of non-traditional educational organizations, such as profit-
oriented entities and philanthropic agencies. Proponents of marketization in education have argued 
that such mixed-mode markets, where for-profit organizations coexist with non-profit ones 
(Marwell & McInerney, 2005), could be the best way to deliver schooling on the grounds that 
competition among service vendors brings about better services, lower prices and higher 
satisfaction. Echoing this promising potential, outsourcing the management and operation of public 
entities from private organizations is becoming increasingly common in the public school systems. 
We specifically call this “private organization or firm that manages public schools, including district 
and charter public schools” an educational management organization, or EMO (Miron & Gulosino, 
2013, p. 2). While the previous business model simply contracted with private organizations to sell 
school supplies or provide transportation services, the currently rising EMOs closely engage in in-
class instruction by providing ready-to-use academic activities and tools (Miron, 2008).  
In particular, the appearance of EMOs fuels the expansion of charter schools, which are 
publicly funded but privately managed (Bulkley, 2005; Engel, 2000). Many state charter school laws 
allow private companies and firms to take part in competitive education markets in the attempt to 
depart from a “one-size-fits-all” model (Miron, Evergreen, & Urschel, 2008; Scott & DiMartino, 
2010). EMOs with specialized knowledge and professional experience have supported the 
establishment and management of charter schools, which are provided with limited administrative 
and instructional support from school districts in exchange for relatively greater autonomy. The 
potential of monetary benefit from leasing contracts with charter school founders has attracted 
profit-oriented EMOs to enter into charter school markets, as well as charter school management 
organizations derived from the non-profit sector in the late 1990s.  
With the growth of charter schools administered by EMOs, differences among charter 
schools by management type have been well-documented (H. Brown, Henig, Lacireno-Paquet, & 
Holyoke, 2004; Fuller, Gawlik, Gonzales, Park, & Gibbings, 2003; Lacireno-Paquet, 2004; Morley, 
2006). Yet, the findings on school budgets, student enrollment patterns and test scores have resulted 
in controversial questions over success and failure of the autonomous public schools operated by 
for-profit EMOs. For example, the extant research points out disparities in charter school 
enrollment patterns according to management orientations, so heightens the concern that for-profit 
EMO-operated charter schools are more likely to serve a lower proportion of minority and 
disadvantaged students (Ertas & Roch, 2014; Henig, Holyoke, Brown, & Lacireno-Paquet, 2005; 
Lacireno-Paquet, Holyoke, Moser, & Henig, 2002; Miron, Urschel, Mathis, & Tornquist, 2010; U.S. 
Government Accountability Office, 2012; Zollers & Ramanathan, 1998). A number of studies 
indicate that students in profit-oriented EMO charter schools have mixed, or often worse, academic 
growth (Byrnes, 2009; Educational Policy Institute, 2005; Garcia, Molnar, & Barber, 2009; Gill, 
Zimmer, Christman, & Blanc, 2007; M. A. Mac Iver & Mac Iver, 2006; Miron, 2008; U.S. 
Government Accountability Office, 2003).  
The discouraging statements established in a wealth of literature on EMOs, however, do not 
provide fundamental information concerning charter schools under profit-oriented organizations. In 
contrast to non-profit EMOs built upon philanthropic objectives and altruistic orientations, EMOs 
driven by the principle of profit maximization reckon with instructional activities as a moneymaking 
commodity to be sold to families. This inherent preference toward monetary incentives groups 
customers into potentially profitable ones or not, and values marketplaces that are likely to be 
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financially rewarding in the future. When a certain fraction of EMOs align their educational activities 
more with maximum returns for investments rather than with benefits to children, their fiscal 
motives are deliberately integrated with a site selection decision for better access to desirable 
customers in convenient regions. Given that service vendor location serves as a gateway to service 
utilization, the involvement of for-profit EMO operated charter schools in traditional public school 
systems has the potential to create EMO charter school deserts or oases. Although the growing 
number of profit-driven EMO charter schools calls for empirical scrutiny of their locations behind 
market features and the resulting impacts on students, there is a dearth of knowledge on the decision 
about where profit-oriented EMOs open their business. Relatively little research has been devoted 
to shedding light on what market characteristics lead for-profit EMOs to engage in education 
markets ultimately serving the public good. Since the privatization in other public service sectors has 
consistently challenged issues such as social inclusion and civic engagement (Warner & Hefetz, 
2002), this study examines locational decision as a critical consideration in generating profit. This 
may offer a glimpse into the economic behavior of particular EMO charter schools, whose initial 
objectives are to maximize profit.  
Research Background 
In the US, the number of enrollments in charter schools operated by private management 
organizations, which are run for profit or operated on a non-profit basis, has reached about 44% 
(Miron & Gulosino, 2013). The number of for-profit EMOs also increased to 97 by operating 840 
charter schools and serving about 460,000 students in the 2011-12 school year, in comparison with 
the 2001-02 school year where 36 for-profit EMOs ran 368 charter schools (Miron & Gulosino, 
2013; Miron, Urschel, Yat Aguilar, & Dailey, 2012; Molnar, Wilson, Restori, & Hutchison, 2002). 
Though for-profit EMOs are steadily expanding their market share of charter schools, a growing 
body of research on profit-motivated EMOs has focused little on underlying questions of who they 
are, what stimulates their engagement in public education, and how they respond to quasi-market 
structures. This section reviews the manner in which business and industry utilize profitable 
opportunities in markets for public services, and outlines how their economic behaviors may be 
replicated and modified in the education sector. 
For-Profit Entity Behaviors in Not-For-Profit Markets 
Inspired by the ideological argument for efficiency and effectiveness of public services 
delivered by competitive markets, a number of local and state governments in the US have 
transferred activities and functions from public spheres to private organizations, only leaving 
authorities to governmental agencies (Starr, 2014; Wettenhall, 2003). This blurring distinction 
between public and private domains not only challenges the traditional approach to distinguishing 
public and private organizations by ownership, funding and control, but also demands empirical 
research on the potentials and pitfalls of competitive environments (Boyne, 2002; Bozeman, 1987; 
Rainey, 1979). Therefore, apart from the examination of productivity in public-private partnerships 
through contracting and outsourcing, the increasing involvement of non-governmental 
organizations in public service delivery invites investigation into how well their behaviors and the 
corresponding consequences demonstrate alignment with public values, such as accountability, 
equity and responsiveness (Besley & Ghatak, 2003; Le Grand, 2007; Warner & Hefetz, 2002). In the 
neoliberal era, searching for a synergy through competition and collaboration between governmental 
agencies and diverse providers, profit-seeking enterprises engaging in a complex joint market have 
been required to share responsibility for equal access to and utilization of services (Bozeman, 2007; 
T. L. Brown, Potoski, & Van Slyke, 2006; Warner & Hefetz, 2002). Proponents of market 
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mechanisms have claimed that the rise of privatization in public service fields would not necessarily 
result in the destruction of equity unlike a zero-sum game (Freeman, 2003; Reitz, 2008).  
Still, much work to date has suggested that private sectors threaten public interest values 
with regard to accessing and utilizing public services in quasi-markets (Andrews & Entwistle, 2010; 
Andrews & Van de Walle, 2013; Robinson, 2007; Warner & Hefetz, 2008). Many researchers have 
found that transfer of public money to private entities fails to keep the balance between private 
interests and democratic values, and causes unintended harm to vulnerable populations in the 
contexts of military and prison (Gran & Henry, 2007; Minow, 2005; Ravitch, 2013). Such criticisms, 
that processes and outcomes by private organizations in public domains undermine social justice, 
have more often targeted for-profit organization than not-for-profit entities. Non-profit 
organizations with diverse missions, including charitable objectives and religious motivations, 
potentially contribute to social inclusiveness and justice (DiMaggio & Anheier, 1990; Weisbrod, 
1988), and indeed several studies evince advantages and benefits of non-profit status organizations 
in public services (Amirkhanyan, Kim, & Lambright, 2008; Cleveland & Krashinsky, 2009; Ferris & 
Graddy, 1999). On the other hand, the distinct organizational orientation toward profit 
maximization often becomes incompatible with collective purposes required in publicly offered 
products and services. Private entities with the focus on economic incentives can maneuver 
strategies to reach out to favorable targets while lowering operating costs and enhancing customer 
satisfaction. (Besley & Ghatak, 2003; Boyne, Powell, & Ashworth, 2001; Garrity, Garrison, & 
Fiedler, 2010). However, such tailored strategies to offer service access to profitable customers do 
not justify the generic goal of obtaining financial gains dedicated by for-profit entrepreneurs. The 
rising delivery of public services by profit-seeking entities cannot be completely free from discourse 
of public interest related to equitable access for service utilization (Cameron, 2004; Haque, 2001; 
Heen, 2004; Sinclair, 2003; Tilak, 2008).  
Impact of Location on Access to Quasi-Markets 
As widely used management behaviors for profit maximization, price competition and 
location selection deserve more attention as illustrative evidence (Hotelling, 1929). However, the 
story becomes complicated in the case of profit-seeking organizations, specifically those that offer 
public services and are operated with public money. Because tax-based services and facilities are not 
initially aimed at yielding a surplus over operating expenses, most public domains regulate and fix 
prices in terms of equitable access to services through increasing affordability. For-profit entities 
serving public services are also restricted from attracting customers through differentiated price 
policies. Thus, as a location decision functions as a major proxy for obtaining financial advantages in 
competitive contexts, profit-seeking organizations may more aggressively value location in order to 
position themselves closer to desirable customers. 
The real problem, as a number of studies have indicated, is that location has historically 
delivered identifiable information with reference to race, ethnicity, income, education, wealth, and 
other factors (Bader & Krysan, 2015; Clark, 1992; Emerson, Chai, & Yancey, 2001; Highsmith & 
Erickson, 2015; Jargowsky, 2014; Krysan, Couper, Farley, & Forman, 2009). Profit-oriented service 
vendors, seeking to identify who are financially profitable customers, can make judgments about 
potential markets on the basis of the demographic and socioeconomic features in a specific place, 
regardless of service benefits and demands. Their behavior holds great potential for empowering a 
certain group of people to exercise choice in markets, or allowing limited access to given student 
populations with special needs in disadvantaged areas (Le Grand, 2007; Savas, 2005; Starr, 2014). In 
other words, the location decision designed for profit maximization in not-for-profit market leads to 
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an over- or under-supply of for-profit organizations in particular regions, which in turn would lead 
to uneven distributions of public services by provider types.  
With regard to the concern about businesses’ reactions caused by locational advantages and 
disadvantages, market theorists have maintained that spatial patterns of for-profit entities in public 
service sectors do not matter. In the past, full access to specific service options has been bounded 
within pre-designed zones invoking the classic argument of voting-with-one's-feet, whereas current 
open marketplaces could allow customers with free will to choose any service option across areas 
without geographic restrictions or interferences (Chubb & Moe, 1990; Tiebout, 1956). Nevertheless, 
previous research consistently demonstrates that choice can only work properly under the 
circumstance where users have access to markets within their adjacent neighborhoods (Briffault, 
1996; Le Grand, 2007; Levett, 2003; Nechyba, 2010). Particularly taking into account most 
beneficiaries who are less likely to travel farther away to shop for public healthcare and education 
(Field & Briggs, 2001; Hastings, Kane, & Staiger, 2005; Neutens, 2015; Roghmann & Zastowny, 
1979), a geographical imbalance between supply and demand may give rise to the lack of 
competition and the declining quality of services in public service markets (Brekke, Siciliani, & 
Straume, 2011; Kain, 1992; Van Slyke, 2003). The manner in which corporations respond to market 
forces through site selections may undermine the foundation of public services pursuing public 
purposes.  
Site Selection of For-Profit EMO Charter Schools 
As service users in education markets, parents are more likely to enroll their children in 
geographically accessible schools and be satisfied with having one or more schools within not-too-
distant areas (Burgess, Greaves, Vignoles, & Wilson, 2015; Glazerman, 1998; Goldring & Hausman, 
1999; Hanushek, Kain, & Rivkin, 2004; Hastings et al., 2005; Le Grand, 2007; Marshall et al., 2010; 
Rhodes & DeLuca, 2014; Theobald, 2005). Despite having with no exclusionary zoning policies, 
proximity has been a factor in utilization of school options in educational markets (Keddie, 2016; 
Lubienski, Lee, & Gordon, 2013). Furthermore, some level of stability in charter school markets, 
derived from little student mobility and government restrictions on school establishment and 
licensing, can reinforce the importance of locational incentives in charter school positioning (Betts, 
2005; Gulosino & Miron, 2017; Hastings et al., 2005; Renzulli & Evans, 2005). With this in mind, it 
is not surprising even if for-profit EMO-operated charter schools become highly dependent upon 
the analysis of a place in which the organizations are able to yield financial gains in territories 
subdivided by race, ethnicity, poverty, education, employment and occupation (Conn, 2002; 
Jargowsky, 1997; Lichter, Parisi, & Taquino, 2012; Massey & Denton, 1993; W. J. Wilson, 2012). For 
example, charter schools initiated by for-profit firms in Washington, DC, were located in census 
tracts with fewer populations of Hispanic origin, more households with homeownership, and more 
vacant school buildings (Henig & MacDonald, 2002). A number of for-profit EMO charter schools 
in the US were more likely to be situated in economically advantaged regions with more 
homeowners and fewer Title-I eligible families (Robertson, 2015). A large proportion of some 
charter schools operated by EMOs running for profit employed certain recruiting strategies 
associated with spatial attributes, by opening their business in areas with more non-disability 
students and socioeconomically advantaged families (Estes, 2004; Gulosino & Lubienski, 2011; U.S. 
Government Accountability Office, 2012; Zollers & Ramanathan, 1998).  
Of course, market strategies used by profit seeking EMOs are not solely responsible for 
charter school locations. State laws and local policies to promote the establishment of charter 
schools in an attempt to serve more at-risk children stall the market entry decision of for-profit 
EMOs. The capacity and inclination of communities can limit the discretion of profit-oriented EMO 
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charter schools on site selection. Nonetheless, extant evidence on spatial preferences of charter 
schools consistently raises concerns that EMOs seek to yield a high return on investment through 
neighboring students in need of less costly and time-consuming services (Gulosino & d'Entremont, 
2011; Gulosino & Lubienski, 2011; Lubienski, Gulosino, & Weitzel, 2009; Robertson, 2015). In spite 
of its considerable contribution, the current studies provide insufficient insights into distinct market 
behaviors presented by EMO charter schools. The findings, mainly drawn from enrollment data of 
student and family characteristics and locational information derived from resident attributes, take 
no account of potential markets for prospective demands and the size of competitors. A few studies 
have illuminated the profit-making schemes of educational organizations, by investigating how 
educational service providers were sensitively responsive to the dynamic of schooling markets 
(Gulosino & Miron, 2017; Weber & Baker, in press). They generally indicated that the inclination to 
strengthen revenue sources over expenditures constructed the geographical cluster of charter 
schools operated by profit-making management organizations by suggesting the high dependence 
upon financial resources. Though there remains the fundamental difference that their studies relied 
on private schools as non-profit organizations, Downes and Greenstein (1996, 2002) studied the 
locational decision of existing and newly opened private schools. Their studies found that private 
schools assigned different value to student demographics and the characteristics of school districts 
and neighboring areas in competitive environments. In enhancing research on the role and limitation 
of for-profit entities in not-for-profit markets, their research results offer a noteworthy and 
comprehensive approach to seeking monetary incentives in educational markets in terms of the 
foundation of public schooling. 
Data and Methods 
This study is not intended to describe simple locational characteristics of for-profit EMO 
charter schools by comparing with other market competitors such as non-profit EMO charter 
schools and private schools. Rather, this study shifts interest toward economic behaviors in order to 
better understand differentiated engagement in profit-seeking. By focusing on the state of Michigan 
with the largest for-profit EMO charter school markets, this allows us to explain how for-profit 
EMO charter schools differently respond to market attributes. 
Charter School Contexts in Michigan 
Legally known in the state as “public school academies,” a charter school in Michigan is “a 
state-supported public school under the state constitution, operating under a charter contract issued 
by a public authorizing body” (Michigan Department of Education, 2012). Like other states 
establishing charter school laws, Michigan charter schools that do not charge tuition shall not 
discriminate applicants on the basis of their race, ethnicity, intellectual or athletic ability, and 
disability status in admission processes. Excluding very few exceptions, enrollment in the charter 
schools is open to all children who reside in Michigan, and is not limited by the political boundaries 
such as attendance zones and school district borders. The Michigan Revised School Code allows 
multiple authorizers, such as the governing board of colleges and universities and intermediate 
(essentially county-level) school districts, to issue a charter school contract and oversee the school. 
Michigan charter schools can make the management agreements on administrative and instructional 
services with for-profit business corporations. The first charter school in Michigan opened in 1994, 
and by the 2010-11 school year Michigan was operating about 270 charter schools, serving 7% of all 
Michigan students. The Detroit metropolitan area has the highest charter school market share 
among school districts serving more than 10,000 students in the United States following New 
Orleans and District of Columbia (National Alliance for Public Charter Schools, 2012). In Michigan, 
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with this highly competitive charter school market, over 70% of total charter schools are operated 
by either non-profit or for-profit EMOs. This market proportion initiated by EMOs is over two 
times higher than the national average of less than 30% of charter schools being run by education 
management organizations.  
Market Density in Site Selection 
Site selection is the business strategy broadly adopted by for-profit firms before they take on 
specific actions to survive in competitive markets and maximize financial gains (Bartik, 1985; Caves 
& Porter, 1977; Fuentelsaz & Gómez, 2006; Marwell & McInerney, 2005; Zhang, Sun, & Tang, 
2013). Therefore, the examination of market conditions affecting site selection has been critical to 
the business and industry sectors, and can offer substantial information about what promotes or 
hinders the evolution of markets. In order to demonstrate circumstances in which organization 
founders define market opportunities, several scholars have explored the difference in organizational 
behaviors among incumbents and late entrants by focusing on timing of market entry (Gallego, 
Hidalgo, Acedo, Casillas, & Moreno, 2009; Lilien & Yoon, 1990; Sinha & Noble, 2005). Exploiting 
the advantage that a judgment of where to locate is explicitly observable, previous studies have 
commonly emphasized that location strategies are closely tied to market densities obtained from the 
evaluation of competitors, as well as consumer features and needs (Bresnahan, Reiss, Willig, & 
Stigler, 1987; Gentry, Dalziel, & Jamison, 2013; Haveman, 1994; Kumar & Subramanian, 1997). 
Apart from the demand size represented by density of the population of school-aged children, the 
volume of service vendors with similar traits located in both physical and competitive distance may 
determine where educational service vendors initiate business, even when controlling for other 
potential market characteristics (Carroll & Hannan, 1989; Miller & Eden, 2006; Stretesky, Huss, & 
Lynch, 2012).  
Given the intermingling of market characteristics and densities in site decision, the research 
design of this study is inspired by the traditional model developed by Bresnahan and Reiss 
(Bresnahan et al., 1987; Bresnahan & Reiss, 1990; 1991), and at the same time guided by the studies 
conducted under Downes and his colleagues (Downes & Greenstein, 1996; Downes & Zabel, 2002). 
To explore market density as a determination of for-profit educational organizations’ location in 
quasi markets, this research works on three assumptions. First, all for-profit EMO charter schools 
have the same objective, maximizing profit. This study presumes that the solid business objective of 
profit-seeking directs a certain group of EMOs in competitive landscapes to common economic 
behaviors. Second, a for-profit EMO charter school competes with educational providers with 
similar features such as pre-existing private schools and other charter schools. Those selected 
competitors in this research have discretion over locating themselves for being privately operated. 
Their decision on site selection takes an influential role in shaping market density in traditional 
school markets where a district's capacity for serving children decides school locations, opening, 
consolidations and closures. Last, the catchment area of a particular for-profit charter school is not 
necessarily limited to the school district in which the charter school is geographically sited. As the 
past research on spatial characteristics of charter schools has insufficiently pictured market features 
that lead charter schools to engaging in a local educational market, the last two assumptions 
contribute to strengthening the significance of this study by paying attention to competitors within 
potential accessible areas. According to these assumptions, charter school i’s decision on location 
into school district j is assumed to be represented by the following equation: 
 
     Equation 1 
 
Ei
j = f (C j,X j,C- j,X- j,wi
j )
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where Cj is the number of competitors in school district j, C-j is the number of competitors in other 
school districts in the choice set, Xj is characteristics of school district j, X-j is characteristics of 
neighboring school districts in the choice set, and ωji is the error term.  
In Equation 1, the manner of defining an appropriate choice set plays a decisive role in 
explaining what features stimulate individual EMOs to get involved in a particular market, which is 
expected to allow the maximization of profits. Some studies establish potential choice sets within a 
given mile radius from homes (Bell, 2009; Burgess, Greaves, Vignoles, & Wilson, 2011; Cobb & 
Glass, 1999), and a number of scholars identify a charter school’s catchment area as the Census 
geographic units and school attendance boundaries to which the charter school belongs (Garcia, 
2008; Ritter, Jensen, Kisida, & Bowen, 2016; Saporito & Sohoni, 2006; 2007; Sohoni & Saporito, 
2009). Even though these technical approaches may be a simple and convenient method, they have 
impeded the progress of research on access to charter schools with non-residence requirements in 
competitive markets. Therefore, this study proposes two choice sets of potential school districts: 1) 
the first adjacent school districts of school district j and 2) all school districts within the same county 
where charter school i is located. This approach expanding accessible markets on the supply side can 
lessen impacts that individual local contexts respond for or against charter school openings in their 
communities on site selection. Considering that state governments have mainly legislated charter 
school rules and regulations, for-profit entities can equally survey the districts in one single state for 
relatively homogenous institutional backgrounds. The probability that charter school i chooses to 
enter at school district j among the set of potential school districts is found by a mixed effects 
logistic regression in R using the lme4 package.  
Data. The list of Michigan traditional public and charter schools during the 2010-11 school 
year was drawn from the Common Core Data by the National Center for Education Statistics, and 
then the charter schools were categorized into two groups, either for-profit or non-profit ones, 
based on the list of EMO charter schools which the National Education Policy Center publishes 
annually. As main competitors of for-profit EMO charter schools, non-public schools in Michigan 
were retrieved from the Michigan Department of Education. Using the Common Core Data, school 
district characteristics include graduation rates, dropout rates, logged expenditures per pupil, and the 
percentages of students who demonstrate proficiency in math, of students who are proficient in 
reading, of English language learners of students eligible for free or reduced lunch, of African-
American students, and of students with Hispanic or Latino origin. Based on the extensive research 
on segregation and stratification, community features at the census block group level take into 
account the percentages of African-American populations, of populations with Hispanic or Latino 
origin, of populations 25 years and over with a high school diploma, of populations 25 years and 
over who have experienced college education for more than one year, of populations aged 25 to 59 
who are unemployed, of families under the poverty level, of housing units occupied by owner, of 
housing units with no car, and vacancy rates. These community features were extracted from the 
2009-2011 American Community Survey 3-year estimates provided by the Census. 
Findings 
A profit-oriented organization’s location decision toward competitive markets can illuminate 
one shade of multifaceted organizational behaviors, by presenting the procedure to define 
prospective consumers and gather information about future markets. As this study operationally 
designs two potential choice sets from the supply side, Table 1 and 2 respectively demonstrate the 
results of the characteristics of school district, community and number of competitors by choice set. 
The first market includes only the closest neighboring school districts from the location of for-profit 
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EMO charter schools, and the second one expands its market size up to the same county where for-
profit EMO charter schools are located.  
Table 1 shows estimates of the parameters for the choice set of the school district where a 
for-profit EMO charter school is located and its closest surrounding school districts. In Model I of 
Table 1, only considering school district characteristics, for-profit EMO charter schools are more 
likely to position themselves in school districts that outperform in math, spend more money, have 
more students eligible for free or reduced-price lunch, and serve more minority students, in 
comparison with the neighboring school districts. However, for-profit EMO charter schools prefer 
school districts that have lower high school graduation rates and fewer students advanced in reading 
in comparison with the adjacent school districts. Model I of Table I specifically stresses that a school 
district’s spending increases three times in the odds ratio that a for-profit EMO charter school 
makes a site selection decision based on the school district, controlling for other characteristics at 
the school district level. In Model II of Table 1, all community features, except for the proportions 
of homeowners and housing units without cars, lead to increases in the odds ratios of positioning in 
a given school district, whereas there is no statistical significance in the unemployment rate and the 
share of populations with Hispanic or Latino origin. Looking at competitors in the choice set in 
Model III of Table 1, for-profit EMO charter schools tend to locate their business in competitive 
school districts where other profit-oriented EMO charter schools and private schools already exist.  
 
Table 1 
The estimates for the choice set of the first neighboring school districts 
 I II III IV V 
School district      
% of proficiency in math 0.245***   0.184*** 0.140*** 
% of proficiency in reading -0.150***   -0.071*** -0.071*** 
Graduation rate -0.002***   -0.008*** -0.020*** 
Dropout rate -0.014***   -0.031*** -0.037*** 
Logged expenditure per pupil 1.409***   1.281*** 2.082*** 
% of English language learners 0.002***   -0.029*** -0.043*** 
% of students eligible for free or reduced lunch 0.016***   0.049*** 0.038*** 
% of African-American students 0.013***   -0.075*** -0.103*** 
% of students with Hispanic or Latino origin 0.038***   -0.046*** -0.055*** 
Community      
% of African-American populations  0.005***  0.082*** 0.100*** 
% of populations with Hispanic or Latino origin  0.092***  0.141*** 0.177*** 
% of population 25 years and over with high school 
diploma 
 0.132***  0.163*** 0.182*** 
% of population 25 years and over with college 
education 
 0.124***  0.159*** 0.165*** 
% of families under the poverty level  0.129***  0.092*** 0.106*** 
% of populations aged 25 to 59 who are unemployed  -0.018***  0.033*** 0.043*** 
Vacancy rate  0.027***  -0.006*** -0.015*** 
% of housing units occupied by owner  -0.049***  -0.061*** -0.081*** 
% of housing units with no car  -0.104***  -0.078*** -0.128*** 
Competitor      
% of for-profit EMO charter schools   0.035***  0.055*** 
% of not-for-profit charter schools   0.020***  0.030*** 
% of private schools   0.026***  0.020*** 
Constant -25.379*** -11.319*** -3.106*** -36.367*** -38.164*** 
* p<.10; ** p<.05; *** p<.01 
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Although small changes of the estimates at the fifth and sixth columns of Table 1 are 
detected when holding competitors at a fixed value, Model V in Table I counts the substantial 
increase in the likelihood that a given school district’s expenditure encourages for-profit EMO 
charter schools to be engaged in the market in a similar fashion to Model I and IV. The last column 
of Table 1 shows that the combination of community characteristics and competitor information 
identifies the three descriptors of school districts, i.e. the proportion of proficiency in reading, the 
percent of Hispanic or Latino students and the graduate rate, as non-significant. Model V in Table 1 
also demonstrates that EMO charter schools with the purpose of profit maximization are more 
likely to be established in a school district with great proportions of African-American and Hispanic 
populations. The proportion of English language learners in a given school district, which is not 
statistically significant in Model 1 of Table 1, contributes to the considerably negative impact on a 
site selection of for-profit EMO charter schools. Taking into consideration market density leads to 
the increase in the coefficients for the statistically significant market factors in Model IV in Table 1, 
except the percent of proficiency in math and the percent of students eligible for free and reduced 
lunch.  
Overall, profit-seeking EMO charter schools tend to situate in communities with 
populations of color and educated adults. The significantly positive estimate of the presence of for-
profit EMO charter schools in a given school district, compared to its adjacent school districts, 
suggests that market research of educational businesses on location corresponds to common factors, 
rather than filling a market niche in the charter school landscape. In addition, the estimates in Table 
I do not emphasize structural differences in the variances by choice set solely embedding the first 
neighboring school districts. Such insignificant variances among the choice sets suggest that the local 
markets in which profit-motivated EMOs select for their business rest on mostly similar 
characteristics, irrespective of any disparities among the counties within the state. 
Given that enrollment in charter schools is not restricted by where students reside, their 
families are able to travel to further charter schools in the neighboring school district and even in a 
more remote one. In other words, for-profit EMOs may broaden an array of competitors and 
enlarge the pool of applicants for charter schools by expanding their future markets. A location 
decision by for-profit EMOs involves the process of differentiating all school districts in a particular 
county and opting for the most desirable one. Table 2 presents estimations of the choice set 
covering all school districts within the county where a for-profit EMO charter school is physically 
located. In comparison with Model I of Table 1 on the basis of the choice set of the closest school 
districts, Model I of Table 2 shows the similar but weak significances in the proportion of 
proficiency in math and the percent of students eligible for free or reduced lunch and from African-
American families. Rather, the estimations for the logged expenditure per pupil and the percent of 
African-American students in a school district increase with the expansion of potential markets from 
the provider perspective. At the community level in Model II of Table 2, the probability of for-
profit EMO charter schools’ decision to situate themselves in a given school district tends to be 
associated with only four factors: The proportions of African-American populations, populations 
with Hispanic or Latino origin, housing units occupied by owner, and housing units with no car. 
While a high density by profit-seeking EMO charter schools and private schools is statistically 
significant in the choice set of the first adjacent school districts as found in Model III of Table I, all 
the competitors in Model III of Table 2 partly contribute to attracting EMO charter schools 
pursuing financial gains.  
As presented in Model IV and V of Table 2, market share caused by entities with similar 
organizational objectives brings about the comprehensive increases in statistical significances and 
estimated coefficients. There exist significant changes by more than 10%, specifically in the odds 
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ratio in logged expenditures per pupil, the percentage of African-American populations, the 
proportion of populations with Hispanic or Latino origin, the proportion of populations who 
experience higher education for one year and over, and the percent of unemployed populations. 
Furthermore, the increases in dropout rates and low-income families seem to stall the establishment 
of profit-oriented EMO charter schools in particular school districts. For-profit EMO charter 
schools tend to tailor applicant pools by being located in school districts with more populations with 
vehicle ownership. Reflecting the notion that disadvantaged families were burdened with the cost of 
travelling to remote schools (Phillips, Hausman, & Larsen, 2012; Reay & Lucey, 2003), availability of 
personal vehicles could be positively related to increased likelihood of auto trips to school.  
All else being equal, school districts with a large number of for-profit EMO charter schools 
and a small number of non-profit EMO charter schools within the county boundaries are more 
likely to attract profit-oriented educational service providers. In view of market density that profit-
oriented EMO charter schools in Michigan select a school district consisting of varying market 
competitors, they are more likely to cluster around, not disperse across, certain school districts with 
a similar type of charter schools. Taken together, this study points out the behavior of the Michigan 
for-profit EMO charter schools, discouraging children with marginalized family backgrounds in 
impoverished communities from equally participating in markets. 
 
Table 2 
The estimates for the choice set of all school districts within the same county 
 I II III IV V 
School district      
% of proficiency in math 0.122***   0.125*** 0.069*** 
% of proficiency in reading -0.026***   -0.027*** -0.015*** 
Graduation rate 0.002***   -0.002*** -0.033*** 
Dropout rate -0.019***   -0.051*** -0.071*** 
Logged expenditure per pupil 2.507***   1.662*** 1.371*** 
% of English language learners 0.073***   0.014*** 0.022*** 
% of students eligible for free or reduced lunch 0.017***   0.073*** 0.050*** 
% of African-American students 0.037***   -0.064*** -0.095*** 
% of students with Hispanic or Latino origin 0.002***   -0.065*** -0.108*** 
Community      
% of African-American populations  0.034***  0.095*** 0.132*** 
% of populations with Hispanic or Latino origin  0.070***  0.119*** 0.197*** 
% of population 25 years and over with high school 
diploma 
 -0.032***  0.043*** 0.060*** 
% of population 25 years and over with college 
education 
 0.021***  0.088*** 0.098*** 
% of families under the poverty level  0.032***  0.000*** -0.017*** 
% of populations aged 25 to 59 who are unemployed  0.038***  0.060*** 0.107*** 
Vacancy rate  0.026***  0.004*** -0.005*** 
% of housing units occupied by owner  -0.044***  -0.042*** -0.067*** 
% of housing units with no car  -0.089***  -0.031*** -0.096*** 
Competitor      
% of for-profit EMO charter schools   0.072***  0.097*** 
% of not-for-profit charter schools   0.028***  -0.014*** 
% of private schools   0.027***  0.032*** 
Constant  -36.083*** -0.191*** -3.249*** -33.490*** -23.062*** 
* p<.10; ** p<.05; *** p<.01 
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Discussion 
The development of EMOs with a goal aligned with financial gains implicitly confirms that 
private firms’ belief that offering core educational services as a commodity is significant enough to 
produce monetary returns on investment. The rise of for-profit EMOs often becomes evidence of 
substantial shifts in the governance of education by suggesting a process for schooling to become 
privatized and commercialized (Bulkley, 2004; Tuckman, 1998). Thus, research on privatization in 
the public education sphere has contributed to understanding what market factors motivate, or 
hinder, EMOs to operate publicly funded charter schools and investigate the corresponding 
consequences. In a similar manner that other business models pursuing maximum profits value site 
selection in market analysis, EMOs are expected to examine school neighborhoods and prospective 
competitors within reachable areas. Based on the critical claim that uneven socio-geographies have 
constructed competitive market hierarchies (Bell, 2007; Gulosino & Lubienski, 2011; Holme, 2002; 
Lubienski & Dougherty, 2009), this study looks into the manner in which for-profit EMO charter 
schools in Michigan evaluate particular school districts by taking into consideration competitors 
within school markets.  
Overall, this study shows that profitable services are not designed to bring advantages to all 
students who reside in areas spanning an entire county, considering that many parents place much 
emphasis on proximity in choosing charter schools. The Michigan for-profit EMO charter schools 
are likely to open their business in school districts which outperform in math, have more at-risk 
students and spend more money for students, compared with adjacent school districts. Even when 
expanding the list of choice sets from the first neighboring school districts to all school districts 
within the same county, the differential impacts on the location decision are similarly found in those 
selected factors at both school district and community level. The research conclusion provides 
evidence consistent with previous results that charter schools in competitive markets protect their 
market position by opting for less costly and more easily educated students, and by excluding 
students from low-income or single-parent families.  
Along with the conventional facts, this study confirms earlier findings that charter schools 
are located in more competitive areas where private schools are already located (Girth, Hefetz, 
Johnston, & Warner, 2012; Glomm, Harris, & Lo, 2005; Miron, 2008). The findings highlight the 
significance of competitors specifically attributed to for-profit EMO charter schools and private 
schools in a similar manner of the close relation between market density and diversification in 
business and industrial markets (Gentry et al., 2013; Haveman, 1994). Though there are additional 
calls for further studies on the response of nonprofit EMO charter schools toward market density 
(Stretesky et al., 2012), the study overall suggests that the denser and more competitive local school 
markets appear to have more diverse profit-driven educational service providers. Moreover, special 
attention is called to the finding that for-profit EMO charter schools open their business in school 
districts with higher expenditures per pupil. Such relative importance of local spending on education 
primarily represents the way in which charter schools under for-profit business models chase money, 
in line with the latest finding that profit-oriented charter schools allocate a smaller portion of their 
expenses to instructional staff (Weber & Baker, in press). Apart from a high likelihood that students 
who reside in a wealthy school district have greater access to diverse school options, this study 
shows that the EMOs with the intent of generating satisfactory profit tend to maximize monetary 
resources through a large reliance on government funding earned by location selection, not through 
benefit from parent choice upon innovation and diversification in instruction-related activities 
(Lubienski, 2009; Lubienski & Lee, 2016; Renzulli, Barr, & Paino, 2015; Teresa & Good, in press; 
U.S. Department of Education, 2016). In other words, the uneven distribution of educational service 
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providers partly demonstrates that competitiveness and marketability obtained through site selection 
has become instrumental in reinforcing geographical barriers to school access.  
In view of underlying variations among local markets, shopping for schools becomes more 
or less favorable to children in a particular region (Lichter et al., 2012; Nechyba, 2010; Putnam, 
2000). Here, the rising concern is that the site selection decision by profit-oriented EMOs 
diminishes democratic values and objectives, which are required for public entities. The widespread 
belief that schooling is a public good has placed for-profit vendors managing of charter schools in 
the category of public entities, so that educational service vendors operating charter schools have 
presented specific understanding of bureaucratic procedures by complying with administrative rules 
and regulations. However, the current processes of privatization in education and commodification 
of schooling fundamentally challenge the two conditions of non-excludability and non-rivalrousness 
essential to define a public good (Labaree, 1997; Lubienski, 2006). The empowerment of the 
demand side in educational markets results in competition for limited seats at quality schools, and 
the Michigan for-profit EMOs’ heavy dependence on profitability financed by local education 
agencies excludes a certain population in a given area. Under this circumstance, their distinctive 
behavior of devoting to self-interest of the supply side may be the byproduct of increasing difficulty 
in positioning the inherent attribute of profit-seeking organizations in appropriate alignment with 
public values in public schooling. Given that the lack of the comprehension of public values in 
competitive markets exposes privately owned and run EMO charter schools to struggles between 
private interests and public purposes (Hansmann, 1980; Labaree, 1997; Lubienski, 2006; Samuelson, 
1954), we should carefully question and consider how private firms pursuing monetary gains make a 
contribution to democratic accountability for equal access (Biesta, 2004; DiMartino & Scott, 2013; 
Epstein, 1993; Garn, 2001; Garn & Cobb, 2001; Shipps & White, 2009). In rethinking the purpose 
of parental choice and competition among educational providers in terms of equitable environments 
as well as efficient structures for public education, discourse about whether to confine schooling 
provided by profit-oriented firms to a public or private commodity is necessary to establish their 
role and limitations. 
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